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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court's jurisdiction rests upon Utah Code Ann. sec. 78A~4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE 1: Did the trial court err in granting Kriser's Motion for Summary Judgment 
by holding that the Andersons "failed to provide any evidence that Matthew 
Kriser knew that the real property in question had collapsible soils 
unsuitable for the construction of a residence"? 
Standard of Review: De novo. B> definition, "a district court does not resolve 
issues of fact at summary judgment." therefore, this Court 
"considers] the record as a whole and review[s] the district 
court's grant of summary judgment de novo, reciting all facts 
and fair inferences drawn from the record in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party." Poteet v. White9 2006 UT 
63, % 7,147 P.3d 439, 441 (Utah 2006). 
Preservation for Appeal: R. at 202-03. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC. 
None. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs/Appellants David and Kristine Anderson filed suit against 
Defendant/Appellee Matthew Kriser on April 5, 2007. (R. at 1-39.) The Andersons 
alleged a single cause of action of fraudulent non-disclosure against Kriser. (R. at 3-4.) 
Briefly, the Andersons alleged that Kriser sold them a residential lot with collapsible 
soils, that Kriser knew about a geotechnical report that contained information about the 
collapsible soils, but that Kriser failed to disclose the existence or contents of that report 
to the Andersons. (R. at 1-39.) 
On May 15, 2008, Kriser moved for summary judgment, arguing he did not know 
about the existence or contents of the geotechnical report and that he did not know the 
property had collapsible soils. (R. at 90-159.) The Andersons timely opposed the motion 
(r. at 195-244), and Kriser timely filed a reply memorandum (r. at 246-301). 
On September 22. 2008, the trial court heard oral argument on Kriser5 s motion. 
(R. at 306-07.) A few weeks later, on October 8, 2008, the court issued an ephemeral 
written decision granting Kriser's summary judgment motion on one ground: that 
although the Andersons alleged fraudulent non-disclosure against Kriser for failing "to 
disclose the presence of collapsible soils that made the real property unsuitable for the 
construction of a residence." the Andersons "failed to provide any evidence that Matthew 
Kriser knew that the real property in question had collapsible soils unsuitable for the 
construction of a residence/' (R. at 323-24.) (A true and correct copy of the trial court's 
ruling is attached hereto as Addendum 1.) 
The Andersons filed their Notice of Appeal on November 6, 2008. (R. at 344-46.) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Earthtec Engineering Conducts a Geotechnical Analysis 
of the Aspen Cove Subdivision in December 1997 
On December 2, 1997, Earthtec Engineering, P.C. issued a report containing the 
results of a geotechnical analysis that Earthtec had conducted on the Aspen Cove 
Subdivision ("Subdivision") in Pleasant Grove, Utah ("Geotech Report"). (R. at 217.) 
Earthtec prepared the Geotech Report for Mr. Drew Kriser, a relative of 
Defendant/Appellee Matthew Kriser. (R. at 217.) 
Earthtec's Geotech Report contained many observations, warnings, and 
recommendations that should have been followed before home construction in the 
Subdivision. For example, the report made the following observations and warnings: 
• "the soil profile varied across the [subdivision]" (r. at 218); 
• "the clays on the site were found to be soft and slightly collapsible when wetted" 
(r. at 218, 221,223); 
• "[pjroper drainage is important to the performance of the footings for [the 
structures that will be built]"(r. at 219); 
• "[w]etting of the foundation soils may cause some degree of volume change 
within the soil and should be prevented both during and after construction" (r. at 
224). 
In addition to these observations, the Geotech Report also warned to over-excavate 
the footings, replace native soil with structural fill, and to keep water away from the 
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footings and foundations of the structures. Specifically, the report made the following 
recommendations: 
• "[w]e recommend footings be extended into the dense native gravels or supported 
on a minimum of 12 inches of structural fill for a bearing capacity of 1500 psf" (r. 
at 218); 
• "[t]opsoil, man-made fill, or soils loosened by construction activities should be 
removed from the building pad and pavement areas prior to foundation 
excavations and site grading fills" (r. at 221); 
• "[foundations should be excavated down to the dense, sandy gravels or, if in silts 
or clays, at least 12inches [sic] beyond the bottom footings" (r. at 221); 
• "[sjoft spots identified during proof rolling should be excavated and replaced with 
structural fill" (r. at 221); 
• "we recommend spread footings be supported on structural fill or extended into 
the dense native gravels" (r. at 223); 
• "[foundations should not be partially supported on structural fill and partially on 
native soils. . . . [I]f structural fill is needed under any portion of the structure, then 
a minimum of 12 inches of structural fill should exist below the entire foundation" 
(r. at 223); 
• "[gjround surface should be graded to drain away from the structures in all 
directions" (r. at 224); 
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• "[r]oof runoff should be collected in rain gutters with downspouts designed to 
discharge well outside of the backfill limits" (r. at 225); 
• "[sjprinkler heads . . . should be aimed away from foundation walls" (r. at 225); 
• "[ojther precautions which may become evident during design and construction 
should be taken" (r. at 225). 
Kriser Knows a Geotechnical Study Is Completed for the Subdivision 
Kriser testified in his deposition that he knew Pleasant Grove City required a 
geotechnical study before the streets could be put in. (R. at 202; Kriser Dep. 19:20-21.) 
He went even further and clarified that he "knew that [a geotechnical report] had to be 
done before [Pleasant Grove City] would allow us to develop [the Subdivision]." (R. at 
202; Kriser Dep. 19:21-23.) 
Thus, by the time Kriser was selling lots—and by his own admission—he knew a 
geotechnical report had been completed, and as a seller and/or developer, he is charged 
with its contents. 
The Andersons Purchase a Lot from Kriser 
in April 1998—Four Months After the Earthtec Geotech Report—but 
Kriser Does Disclose the Existence or Contents of the Report 
In 1998, the Andersons approached Kriser to inquire about purchasing a lot in the 
Aspen Cove "A" development in Pleasant Grove, Utah. (R. at 2, 199.) On April 30, 
1998, the Andersons signed a one-page document, titled "Offer to Purchase" ("Offer"), to 
buy lot number two in the development ("Property"). (R. at 2, 199.) The Offer included 
a description of the Property and stated the purchase price. (R. at 199.) (A true and 
correct copy of the Offer is attached hereto as Addendum 2.) 
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As far as the Andersons understood, they were purchasing the property from 
Kriser personally; they did not know, understand, or believe that they were dealing with 
Kriser in a representative capacity. (R. at 2, 199.) Further evidence of this belief is 
reflected by the Offer itself: 
• At the bottom of the Offer, it reads, "Seller accepts the foregoing offer on the 
terms and conditions specified above." (Add. 2.) The Offer then provides a 
signature line for the seller, and under the line, it reads, "Sellers Signature" [sic]. 
(Add. 2.) Kriser signed on that line as "Matthew Kriser"—not as "Country Living 
Development," "Matthew Kriser for Country Living Development," or any other 
permutation that would have indicated that Country Living Development, rather 
than Matthew Kriser, was selling the property. (Add. 2.) (R. at 215.) 
• The Offer does not define who the "seller" is. The only way to detennine that is to 
look at the signature above the "Seller's Signature" line, which clearly reads, 
"Matthew Kriser." (Add. 2.) (R. at 215). 
• The Offer does not contain the words "Country Living Development" or any other 
indication that the seller is anyone other than Matthew Kriser. (Add. 2.) (R. at 
215.) 
Before purchasing the home, neither Kriser (nor anyone else) told the Andersons 
about the 1997 Earthtec Geotech Report. (R. at 199.) Moreover, before purchasing their 
lot in the Subdivision, the Andersons did not know about the 1997 Earthtec Geotech 
Report. (R. at 199.) 
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Ultimately, the Andersons closed on their purchase on or about June 1, 1998. (R. 
at 2.) 
Shortly After Moving in, 
the Andersons Discover Problems with Their New Home 
After moving in, the Andersons discovered various unsuitable conditions related 
to the underlying ground and soil beneath and surrounding their home. (R. at 2.) The 
soil conditions resulted in significant damage to the Andersons' home, including but not 
limited to settling in and around the home, cracking around windows, exterior cladding, 
and cracking in concrete walls and the basement slab. (R. at 2.) 
Kriser Visits the Andersons After they Filed Suit 
After the Andersons filed this law suit, Kriser visited their home. (R. at 199.) 
Among other things, Kriser told the Andersons that he saw in the 1997 Earthtec Geotech 
Report that Earthtec had dug a test pit directly in front of the Andersons' home. (R. at 
199-200.) Kriser also implied that he made a mistake by not disclosing the Earthtec 
Geotech Report and by failing to follow its recommendations, saying, "We were a young 
company at the time we did this development." (R. at 200.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This case is about a builder-developer who failed to disclose the existence or 
contents of a geotechnical report to a buyer, as required under Yazdv. Woodside Homes 
Corp., 143 P.3d 283 (Utah 2006). 
By his deposition testimony, and by his admission that it was his "general 
practice" to obtain a geotechnical study before constructing roads in a subdivision, Kriser 
knew a geotechnical study had been done in the Aspen Cove Subdivision by the time he 
sold the Andersons their lot. And as a builder-developer. Utah Supreme Court precedent 
charges him with a duty to disclose the existence of the 1997 Earthtec Geotech Report to 
a buyer. Kriser failed in that duty. Now, the Andersons pay for Kriser's mistake with a 
brand new home that is falling apart. 
ARGUMENT 
The only issue on appeal is whether Kriser knew about the 1997 Earthtec Geotech 
Report. Kriser says he did not (r. at 94), while the Andersons argue he did, by admission 
at his deposition (r. at 202) and by his admission that it was his "general practice" to 
obtain a geotechnical study before constructing roads in a subdivision (r. at 94). 
This creates a disputed issue of material fact, and the trial court erred when it 
granted summary judgment to Kriser. This Court should reverse and remand for trial on 
the merits. 
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L KRISER KNEW A GEOTECHNICAL STUDY HAD BEEN COMPLETED 
BY THE TIME HE SOLD THE ANDERSONS THEIR LOT. 
Kriser argued that when he sold the lot to the Andersons, he did not know that a 
geotechnical report had been done. But Kriser's deposition testimony contradicts that 
denial, as well as Kriser5 s statement that it was his "general practice" to conduct a 
geotechnical study before constructing the roads in a subdivision. In addition, Kriser"s 
denial is also belied by a statement he made to the Andersons after they filed this lawsuit. 
Thus, at a minimum, and viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the Andersons, 
there is a disputed issue of material fact whether Kriser knew about the geotechnical 
report (and/or its contents) when he sold the lot to the Andersons. Therefore, the Court 
should reverse and remand for trial on the merits. 
Kriser testified in his deposition that he knew the city required a geotechnical 
study to be completed before the streets could be put in. (R. at 202; Kriser Dep. 19:20-
21.) By deduction, this fact alone evidences Kriser's understanding that when he sold the 
lot to the Andersons, he knew a geotechnical analysis had been completed. And this fact 
alone justifies the Court in reversing the trial court's grant of Kriser's motion. 
But in addition to this, in his deposition, Kriser went on to clarify his 
understanding of performing a geotechnical report for the subdivision. He stated that he 
"knew that [a geotechnical study] had to be done before the city would allow us to 
develop [the subdivision]." (R. at 202; Kriser Dep. 19:21-23.) 
In other words, contrary to his Statement of Fact No. 10 (r. at 94), Kriser knew— 
prior to and during the sale of the lot to the Andersons—that the city required a 
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geotechnical study before the city would have even allowed Kriser to develop the 
subdivision at all. Therefore, Kriser was aware that a geotechnical analysis had been 
completed by the time he sold the lot to the Andersons. And it is undisputed that Kriser 
did not disclose the existence or contents of the Earthtec Geotech Report to the 
Andersons. 
In addition, Kriser seems to play semantics in his "statement of facts" from his 
summary judgment motion concerning whether he knew about the Geotech Report, 
whether he read it, or whether he "saw" it: 
11. Moreover, at the time of the sale to the Plaintiffs, Matthew Kriser did 
not understand or know that he Aspen Cove soils test [the Earthtec 
Geotech Report] made any recommendations for construction on 
residential lots in the Aspen Cove development. . . . 
12. Matthew Kriser did not see the Earthtec soils report prior to the sale 
to the Plaintiffs 
(R. at 94.) (Emphases added.) 
The only facts that can be drawn from these statements are: 
1. Kriser did not understand the recommendations made in the Earthtec 
Geotech Report, and 
2. Kriser did not personally see the Earthtec Geotech Report. 
Conspicuously absent from these statements is a clear, unequivocal statement that 
Kriser categorically did not know about the existence or contents of the Earthtec Geotech 
Report. 
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Moreover, in his statement of facts, Kriser also admitted that it was his '"general 
practice" to perform a geotechnical evaluation before constructing the roads in a 
development (R. at 94.) 
In addition to Kriser5s own admissions, he also made incriminating statements to 
the Andersons indicating he knew about the Earthtec Geotech Report. After the 
Andersons filed this law suit, Kriser, who is a neighbor of the Andersons, stopped by the 
Andersons house to talk about the suit. (R. at 203.) Among other things, Kriser told Mr. 
Anderson that Kriser saw in the geotechnical report that Earthtec had dug a test pit right 
in front of the Andersons' house. (R. at 203.) Kriser also told Mr. Anderson that "we 
were a young company at the time we did this development." (R. at 203.) 
These statements further cut against Kriser's self-serving statements that he did 
not know about the existence or content of the Earthtec Geotech Report when he sold the 
Andersons their lot. 
Therefore, at a minimum, viewing these facts in a light most favorable to the 
Andersons, there is a disputed issue of material fact whether Kriser knew about the 
Geotech Report (and/or its contents) when he sold the lot to the Andersons. Therefore, 
this Court should reverse the trial court's grant of Kriser's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
IL AS A BUILDER-DEVELOPER, KRISER IS CHARGED WITH THE 
EXISTENCE AND CONTENTS OF THE EARTHTEC GEOTECH 
REPORT, WHICH HE FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO THE ANDERSONS, 
Kriser was a builder-developer when he sold the Andersons their lot. Therefore, 
he had a legal obligation to disclose at least the existence of the Earthteh Geotech Report. 
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Kriser failed to do even that, so he should be held liable for the resulting damage to the 
Andersons' home, which they could have prevented had Kriser adhered to his duty as a 
builder-developer. 
In Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., the Utah Supreme Court established that a 
builder-developer owes a duty to a home purchaser to exercise "reasonable care to insure 
that the subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some type of ordinary, average 
dwelling house and he must disclose to his purchaser any condition which he knows or 
reasonably ought to know makes the subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential 
building." 2006 UT 47, \ 24 143 P.3d 283, 288 (Utah 2006). This is because home 
construction requires a high degree of skill, knowledge, and expertise, "including 
knowledge of soil conditions." Id. And the disparity in that skill and knowledge between 
a home buyer and a builder-developer leads to the buyer relying on the expertise of the 
builder-developer. Id. 
In his deposition, Kriser admitted that his "current occupation" was as a 
"[bjuilder/developer." (R. at 204; Kriser Dep. 4:16-17.) And as a builder-developer, the 
policy statements pronounced in Yazd undoubtedly apply to Kriser because he had the 
skill, knowledge, and expertise to ensure that the Andersons' lot was suitable for 
residential building. But Kriser failed to disclose the Geotech Report, which could have 
prevented the damage to the Andersons' home. 
Moreover, Kriser knew a geotechnical analysis had to be completed before the city 
would allow the subdivision to be developed. (R. at 204; Kriser Dep. 19:20-23.) So 
when Kriser sold the Andersons their lot, he must have known that a soils report had been 
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done. Yet he took no steps to comply with his duty by telling the Andersons about the 
Earthtec Geotech Report or its contents. Rather, he chose to ignore his legal duty and 
ignore the recommendations in the Geotech Report, which caused the Andersons' home 
to experience severe settling and damage. 
The three elements of fraudulent concealment are: "(1) there is a legal duty to 
communicate information,1 (2) the nondisclosed information is known to the party failing 
to disclose, and (3) the nondiclosed information is material." Yazd, 2006 UT 47, *[} 35, 
143 P.3d at 289. In this case, Kriser had a legal duty to communicate the information 
1
 Even if Kriser were not a builder-developer, Utah law clearly holds that a seller 
of real property has a duty to disclose defects that cannot be discovered by reasonable 
care. For example, in Mitchell v. Christensen, the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
defendant, a property seller, had a legal duty to tell the plaintiff, the property buyer, that 
the swimming pool had leaks. 2001 UT 80, H 11, 31 P.3d 572, 574-75 (Utah 2001). This 
information was deemed material, and the defendant should have revealed it. Id. The 
court went on to state that although a property seller need not reveal "all he or she knows 
about the property," he or she does have a "duty to communicate or disclose in a vendor-
vendee transaction . . . where a defect is not discoverable by reasonable care." Id. 
(citation and quotations omitted). In determining what constitutes "reasonable care," "the 
proper standard is whether the defect would be apparent to ordinary prudent persons with 
like experience, not to persons with specialized knowledge in the field or construction or 
real estate." Id. at 575. 
In this case, it is clear that Kriser—whether or not a builder-developer—had a duty 
to disclose the soils information because it is material (i.e., "important"), and the 
Andersons would not have been able to discover it through reasonable care. They did not 
have the specialized knowledge in construction and real estate that Kiiser did. Therefore, 
Kriser had a duty to disclose the Earthtec Geotech Report. 
Kriser may argue that even if the duties of a builder-developer apply to Kriser, 
those duties were satisfied when the soils report was filed with Pleasant Grove City. But 
even under Yazd and Loveland v. Or em City Corp., 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987), when a 
builder-developer makes a geotechnical report public, that does not obviate the builder-
developer's duty to disclose at least the existence of the geotechnical report to the buyer. 
There is no support for this novel legal argument in Yazd or Loveland, let alone any other 
Utah case. 
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because he was a self-admitted builder-developer. Kriser knew about the nondisclosed 
information because he knew a geotechnical report had to be completed before the city 
would allow the subdivision to be developed. (R. at 205; Kriser Dep. 19:20-23.) And the 
nondisclosed information was material, which the supreme court defined as "important/' 
id., because it would have influenced the Andersons' judgment to purchase the lot. (R. at 
205.) 
Kriser—the builder-developer—was in the best position to protect the 
Andersons—the unsophisticated buyer—against settling and other problems. He 
admitted in his deposition that he was a builder-developer, and as such, the duties of Yazd 
apply. Kriser failed to adhere to those duties, and as a result, he should be held liable for 
his failures. And at a minimum, these facts justify reversing the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment for Kriser. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the trial court's grant of 
Kriser s Motion for Summary Judgment and remand for trial on the merits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of April 2009. 
HILL. JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
Stephen Quesenbferry 
Charles L. Perschon 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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I hereby certify that on the 21st clay of April 2009, two true and correct copies of 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID ANDERSON and KRISTINE 
ANDERSON, 
Plaintiffs, JUDGMENT 
vs 
MATTHEW KRISER, 
Civil No 070401158 
Defendant | Judge McVey 
This matter came on regularly and duly before the Court, Judge Samuel McVey 
presiding Plaintiffs were present and represented by counsel, Charles Perschon of the firm of 
Hill, Johnson & Schmutz, Defendant was represented by counsel, Robert L Jeffs of the firm of 
Jeffs & Jeffs, P C The court having reviewed the memoranda filed by the parties and being fully 
advised m the premises, now enters its Order as follows 
Plaintiffs herein have alleged a cause of action against Defendant Matthew Kriser, for 
fraudulent non-disclosure alleging that Matthew Kriser failed to disclose the presence of 
collapsible soils that made the real property unsuitable for the construction of a residence. 
Plaintiffs have failed to provide any evidence that Matthew Kriser knew that the real property in 
question had collapsible soils unsuitable for the construction of a residence. The Court grants 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment, and hereby dismisses Plaintiffs' complaint, with 
prejudice. Defendant is awarded costs in the amount of $1,676.95 
DATED and SIGNED this day of September, 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
Samuel McVey 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the^/yaay of September 2008,1 caused the foregoing Judgment 
to be served by depositing a true and correct copy thereof in the United States mails, first-class 
postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Charles Perschon 
HILL JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, LC 
RiverView Plaza, Suite 300 
4844 North 300 West 
Provo,UT 84604-5663 
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Tab 2 
Real Estate Purchase Contract 
Offer to Purchase 
^ J offers to purchase the property 0 ^A/477^ IP- Jv<k 
1. PROPERTY: j/Mfa/T / ^
 / _ . 
also described as: j&r •*£• ? - ,4%®'° r-&^ U/^' 
city of P/iA^jr/lfaa ,County of ^ V .State of Utah (the "Property"). 
1.1 Included Items: 
1.2 Excluded Items: 
1.3 Water Rights: Al<r^^ - _ _ ^ 
1.4 Survey; ^ 7££n, * / PQ^^X^^^ 
2. PURCHASE PRICE. The purchase price for the property is $ 
2.1 Method of Payment. The purchase price will be paid as follows: c&O £jtf. 
,
 r, nk ^'wfy /A**~' 
$ &?
 flT&'c> (a)New Loan 
(b)Seller Financing. 
$ 51?. f&& Total Purchase Price 
r—^  
3, Special Contingencies^ 
4. Additional Terms & Conditions 
5. CLOSING. This transaction shall be closed on or before / W / ,19 f%? . 
^ssession of property shall occur within / hours after closing. _ .
 nrCy 
$£KZ< 4A^9^ thy*?—T^ ?• w w crfogr wrt 
vfers Signature Date Address & Phone 
Seller^ccepts the forgoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above. 
